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”[W]ould not a lawyer coming before a recently elected judge be
concerned if opposing counsel had contributed to the judge’s campaign
...particularly if the concerned lawyer had not contributed to that
campaign?
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"[W]ould not a lawyer coming before a recently elected judge be
concerned if opposing counsel had contributed to the judge's campaign
...particularly if the concerned lawyer had not contributed to that
campaign?"' That question, posed by Florida Supreme Court Justice
Ben F. Overton in an address delivered in April 1989,2 was prophetic.
The following September, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal re-
sponded, holding in Breakstone v. MacKenzie that a lawful campaign
contribution to a judge or even to the judicial campaign of a judge's
spouse is legally sufficient grounds for disqualification of a judge upon
a motion by the non-contributing party.4 In January 1990, however,
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal aligned itself with the dissent
in Breakstone, holding in Keane v. Andrews,5 that a legal campaign
contribution by a lawyer to a judge is not legally sufficient grounds for
disqualification when the contributing lawyer appears before the recipi-
ent judge.6
Justice Overton had the opportunity to answer his own question
when the Florida Supreme Court recently decided the issue.7 In Break-
stone,8 the court could either eviscerate the state's system of choosing
its trial court judges through competitive nonpartisan elections9 or
1. Overton, Trial Judges and Political Elections. A Time for Re-examination, 2
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 10 (1988-89).
2. Id.
3. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (en
banc); consolidated with Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc. v. MacKenzie.
4. Id. at 1166.
5. Keane v. Andrews, 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Keane, and
a subsequent case, also styled Keane v. Andrews, 561 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1990) and involving the same parties as well as the same issue is currently pending
before the Florida Supreme Court. In both cases Dr. Moulton Keane moved for the
disqualification of Broward County Circuit Court Judge Robert L. Andrews on
grounds that opposing counsel had contributed to the judge's campaign.
6. Keane,'555 So. 2d 940.
7. MacKenzie v. Breakstone, 15 Fla.L. Weekly 397 (1990).
8. Id.
9. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b). Section 10(a) was amended to provide for merit
1
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spare the system that no one really wants, a system that draws breath
directly from the yawn of public apathy.10 With the exception of Jus-
tice Overton, the court chose the status quo," but not without reserva-
tions. "I concur in the majority's opinion because I believe it endorses
the lesser of the evils from which we must choose," Justice Kogan said
in his concurring opinion.' "And in so concluding, I have many re-
grets," he added.' 3
The majority held that a lawful contribution to the election cam-
paign of a judge or the judge's spouse is not legally sufficient grounds
for disqualification.' 4 However, the court upheld the third district's
grant of writs of prohibition to disqualify Judge MacKenzie on other
grounds. 5 Justice Overton concurred in the result, but set forth in a
separate opinion his view that a $500 contribution to a judicial election
campaign may be legally sufficient grounds for disqualification of a
judge.' 6
retention of supreme court justices and district court judges. Section 10(b) provides for
the election of circuit and county court judges as follows:
Circuit judges and judges of county courts shall be elected by vote of the
qualified electors within the territorial jurisdication of their respective
courts. The terms of circuit judges shall be for six years. The terms of
judges of county courts shall be for four years.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
10. See Schotland, Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges'
Robes the Emperor's Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57 (1985).
Voter apathy and unawareness in the area of judicial elections has been docu-
mented by several studies. Examples offered by the author include a 1976 Texas elec-
tion exit poll in which just 15.4% of the voters were able to name a supreme court
candidate, 4.9% could name a district court candidate, and only 2.4% were able to
name a county court candidate. Not so suprisingly, 69 percent of those asked said they
preferred the election of judges over appointment. Id. at 86-88.
Even those closest to the existing system of picking trial court judges, lawyers and
the judges themselves, dislike the system. See Overton, supra note 1, at 21-22.
11. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
12. Id. at 400.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 397-98.
15. The supreme court upheld the third district's ruling in Breakstone that Judge
MacKenzie impermissibly passed on the facts contained in the motion for disqualifica-
tion and should be disqualified on that basis. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399-
400. The supreme court also upheld the district court's ruling in Super Kids that Judge
MacKenzie should have granted a motion for disqualification rather than granting an
ore tenus motion for withdrawal of the counsel who had contributed to the judicial
campaign of Judge MacKenzie's husband. Id.
16. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401.
[Vol. 15
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This comment examines the rationales on both sides of the Break-
stone controversy. Part I summarizes the facts of the case as well as
the majority and dissenting opinions of the Third District Court of Ap-
peal. Part II focuses on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Break-
stone, analyzing what the court said as well as what the court did not
say. Policy considerations involved in this controversy are discussed in
Part III. Finally, Part IV concludes that the Breakstone decision failed
to recognize the potential for infringement on litigants' due process
right to judicial imparitiality in its conclusion that a lawful contribu-
tion to a judicial election campaign is not legally sufficient grounds for
disqualification.
Part I
This section separately summarizes the facts of Breakstone v.
MacKenzie'7 and Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc. v. MacKenzie. 8 Part
I also summarizes the majority and dissenting opinions of the Third
District Court of Appeal.
A. Breakstone
The Florida Supreme Court's consideration of judicial disqualifica-
tion in cases involving campaign contributors sprang from a chance en-
counter in the anteroom of Dade County. Circuit Court Judge Mary
Ann MacKenzie.' 9 Arthur Breakstone, the defendant in a postjudg-
ment garnishment proceeding, was in the anteroom with his counsel
and plaintiff's counsel awaiting a hearing before Judge MacKenzie
when the judge's husband paid a visit to his wife in chambers.2" The
judge's husband was at that time a candidate for circuit court judge.'
Two days after the anteroom encounter Breakstone's attorney learned
that opposing counsel had contributed $500 to the husband's judicial
campaign and promptly filed a motion to disqualify Judge MacKen-
zie.12 "The suggestion is that there was a specific opportunity for the
17. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1164.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1164 n. 2. The third district stated that its analysis was based on the
contribution itself, not the circumstances under which the contribution became a cause
of concern to Arthur Breakstone and his counsel.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1166.
22. Id. at 1164 n. 2.
1991]
3
Cooke: Breakstone v. MacKenzie: In a Case Where Fear of Bias is Raised b
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
husband to mention the $500 contribution by the plaintiff's counsel sit-
ting in the anteroom, and that such information, however innocently
imparted, would inevitably create a favorable bias toward the $500
contributor," the court stated.
23
Judge MacKenzie denied Breakstone's motion for disqualifica-
tion.24 After finding the motion to be legally insufficient, the judge
stated:
I cannot address your motion as far as the truth or misinformation
that you may have or not have or anything like that. But I will
state for the record that I kept absolutely clear of my husband's
campaign, had nothing to do with it whatsoever. Couldn't go to a
judicial luncheon-went to one and it was followed all over by The
Miami Herald, and that's the last time I went to anything. And
who donated to his campaign and who did not donate to his cam-
paign, I don't know. I have not looked at his records. So in no way
could I be prejudiced. 25
During the same hearing Judge MacKenzie expressed "frustration
for not being in my husband's campaign. . . . In fact, if I had been in
it, he would have won, and that's for real."26 On the basis of the
judge's comments, Breakstone renewed his motion for disqualification
on the grounds that the judge had impermissibly passed on the merits
of the original motion for disqualification.2 1 Judge MacKenzie also de-
nied the renewed motion.28
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1166. Under Florida law, judicial disqualification in civil cases is gov-
erned by Rule 1.432 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Applicable standards for
disqualification are contained in Florida Statutes section 38.10 and Canon 3(C) of the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Florida statutes pertaining to judicial disqualification and
judicial elections are considered in Part II.
The issue of whether a judge should decide a motion for his or her own disqualifi-
cation is beyond the scope of this note. For a full discussion of the matter, see
D'Agostino, Recusal of Judges for Reasons of Bias or Prejudice: A Survey of Florida
Law - Proposal for Reform, 11 NovA L. REv. 201 (1986).
25. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d 1164.
26. Id.
27. Id. See Rule 1.432(d), FLA. R. Civ. P.; Bundy v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d 440, (Fla.
1978) ("[A] judge who is presented with a motion for disqualification 'shall not pass on
the truth of the facts alleged nor adjudicate the question of disqualification.' ") Id. at
442 (quoting FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.230(d)).
28. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d 1164.
[Vol. 15
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Super Kids29 was a subsequent, separate case before Judge Mac-
Kenzie and the plaintiff's lawyer was the same contributing counsel
who had represented the plaintiff in Breakstone.30 Based on the law-
yer's same $500 campaign contribution and the third district's panel
holding in Breakstone that Judge MacKenzie should have disqualified
herself,3' defendant Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., moved for disqual-
ification.32 During a hearing on the motion, plaintiffs counsel offered to
withdraw from the case and made a motion for substitution of
counsel. 33
After stating that on the basis of the third district's panel holding
in Breakstone the motion for disqualification was legally sufficient,
Judge MacKenzie granted the ore tenus motion for substitution and
then denied the motion for disqualification. 4
C. Opinions of the Third District Court of Appeal
The third district's en banc hearing and rehearing of the two con-
solidated cases produced a sharply divided 5-4 decision in which the
majority held that a lawful campaign contribution of $500 to either a
judge or the judge's spouse is legally sufficient grounds for disqualifica-
tion.3" Judge Nesbitt's dissenting opinion argued that since the legisla-
ture set a $1,000 limit on contributions to trial court judicial cam-
paigns, a $500 contribution could not be the basis of a reasonable fear
of prejudice.3 6 In a separate dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Schwartz
emphasized policy considerations, including concern that the majority




31. Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
32. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1166.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1172-73.
35. Id. at 1166.
36. Id. at 1174 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting) (citing FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e)
(1987)).
37. Id. at 1178.
1991]
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1. The Majority
The third district majority opinion written by Judge Cope stated
that both Florida's codified law,38 and case law3 9 require a judge's dis-
qualification when a party reasonably fears bias.40 Judge Cope further
stated that the litigant's fear must be taken as being reasonable so long
as the allegations are neither frivolous nor fanciful.41
The majority reasoned that because a $500 campaign contribution
is both substantial and beyond the financial means of the ordinary liti-
gant, a reasonable person would fear prejudice on the part of the recip-
ient judge in favor of the contributing party.42
The majority went on to argue that the statutory S1,000 limit on
contributions to trial court judicial campaigns43 is not a legislative
statement which implies no reasonable fear of prejudice could stem
from contributions of $1,000.or less.44 Judge Cope pointed to state elec-
tion law requiring disclosure of campaign contributions and expendi-
tures45 as evidence that the legislature recognized the potential for bias
in lawful contributions, requiring disclosure so the public can make its
own assessments. 46
2. The Dissent
Judge Nesbitt's dissenting opinion argued that a lawful campaign
contribution cannot form the basis for a reasonable fear of bias because
the amount contributed is within the limits established by the legisla-
ture as being permissible.' 7 Nesbitt noted that if the legislature's intent
in enacting the contribution cap and the disclosure laws was to permit
members of the public to "draw their own conclusions," then the pur-
pose would be accomplished by the disclosure laws alone and there
would be no need for a limit on campaign contributions."
38. Id. at 1167 (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432; FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1987)).
39. See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1085-1086 (Fla. 1983); Dickenson
v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 582, 140 So. 459, 462 (1932).
40. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1166-73.
41. Id. at 1167.
42. Id. at 1168.
43. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1987).
44. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1171.
45. Id. (referring to FLA. STAT. §§ 105.08, 106.07 (1987)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1175.
48. Id. at 1174.
[Vol. 15
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 13
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol15/iss1/13
Cooke
The opinion also stated that electing trial court judges through
contested nonpartisan elections reflects the will of the people and that
campaigns and campaign funding are "necessary evils."149 If the public
is dissatisfied with the system, Nesbitt said, it is the legislature, not the
courts, which must respond to those concerns. 50
In his separate dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Schwartz opined
that the majority replaced a presumption that lawful campaign contri-
butions were proper with a "conclusive presumption of impropriety."51
Schwartz added that the appearance of impropriety to the uninformed
does not amount to legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.52 "We
cannot operate a judicial system, or indeed a society, on the basis of the
factually unsubstantiated perceptions of the cynical and distrustful,"
Schwartz wrote.53
The third district certified the following question to the supreme
court:
IS A TRIAL JUDGE REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY HERSELF
ON MOTION WHERE COUNSEL FOR A LITIGANT HAS
GIVEN A $500 CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITI-
CAL CAMPAIGN OF THE TRIAL JUDGE'S SPOUSE?54
Part II
The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question in the
negative,55 but affirmed the lower court's writ of prohibition disqualify-
ing Judge MacKenzie on other grounds.56 The court, speaking through
Justice Ehrlich, held that a legal campaign contribution to a judge or
to a judge's spouse is not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification
of a judge.5 7 Justice Overton concurred in the result, but wrote sepa-
rately, arguing that the majority had reached the wrong conclusion on
that a lawful campaign contribution could spawn a reasonable fear of
judicial bias.58 Justice Kogan concurred in the majority opinion but
49. Id. at 1176.
50. Id. at 1177.
51. Breakstone, 561 So. 2d at 1178.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id at 1173.
55. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399.
56. Id. at 399-400.
57. Id. at 397-98.
58. Id. at 401.
1991]
7
Cooke: Breakstone v. MacKenzie: In a Case Where Fear of Bias is Raised b
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
wrote separately to express his concerns over the troubling policy con-
siderati.ons which he would anticipate stemming from the adoption of
Overton's view.5"
This part of the article is divided into two sections. The first deals
with what the majority opinion said. The second deals with what the
majority chose to ignore. Justice Kogan's concerns are addresed in Part
III under the heading of public policy considerations.
A. What the Majority Said
The court arrived at its conclusion in Breakstone by applying first
amendment freedom of association principles which were enunciated by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, ° and adopted by the
Florida Supreme Court in Richman v. Shevin.6 ' In determining the
constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of
1971,62 the Buckley Court stated that congressional limits on campaign
contributions did implicate freedom of association,6" but upheld the
$1,000 limitation on contributions as a means of checking the two evils
which the Court saw as being associated with campaign contributions:
1) The creation of a quid pro quo between contributor and recipient,
and, 2). the appearance of a quid pro quo. 4
Justice Ehrlich concluded in Breakstone. that the twin evils of
campaign contributions (corruption and the appearance of corruption)
are adequately managed by Florida election laws and Florida's Code of
Judicial Conduct.65 The court cited the statutory provisions limiting
contributions to candidates for *circuit and county court judgeships to
$1,000,16 and requiring public 'disclosure of campaign contributions in
59. Id. at 400-01.
60. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
61. 354 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1977). The court held inter alia that the Dade County
Judicial Trust Fund was a political committee within the definition of Florida Statutes
section 106.011(2). Id. at 1265. The ruling effectively ended the attempt by the Dade
County Bar Association to fund judicial election campaigns through a trust fund rather
than through direct contribution from lawyers to judicial candidates.
62. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1988).
63. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1976).
64. Id. at 26-27.
65. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 398.
66. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1989) states in part:
(1) No person, political committee, or committee of continuous existence
shall make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this
state, for any election, in excess of the following amounts:
[Vol. 15
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The court also pointed to Canon 7(B) of Florida's Code of Judicial
Conduct as providing an additional safeguard against corruption or the
appearance of corruption which might stem from judicial campaign
contributions.6" Canon 7(B)(2) provides as follows:
A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial of-
fice that is filled by public election between competing candidates
should not himself solicit campaign funds, or solicit attorneys for
publicly stated support, but he may establish committees of respon-
sible persons to secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his
campaign and to obtain public statements of support for his candi-
dacy. Such committees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign
contributions and public support from any person or corporation
authorized by law. A candidate's committees may solicit funds for
his campaign only within the time limitation provided by law. A
candidate should not use or permit the use of campaign contribu-
tions for the private benefit of himself or members of his family. 9
Canon 7(B)(2) is designed to insulate judicial candidates from the
financial aspects of their campaigns through the use of campaign com-
mittees to solicit and accept contributions. However, the Breakstone0
court failed to account for the contradiction of purpose between Canon
7(B)(2), which tries to isolate the judicial candidate from knowledge of
(e) To a candidate for county court judge or circuit judge, $1,000.
Id.
67. Florida Statutes section 106.07(l)(4)(a) states in part:
(1) Each campaign treasurer designated by a candidate ... shall file reg-
ular reports of all contributions received ... by or on behalf of such can-
didate...
(4)(a) Each report required by this section shall contain:
1. The full name, address, and occupation, if any, of each person who has
made one or more contributions to or for such committee or candidate
within the reporting period, together with the amount and date of such
contributions. However, if the contribution is $100 or less or is from a
relative, as defined in section 112.3135(1)(c), provided that the relation-
ship is reported, the occupation of the contributor need not be listed, and
only the name and address are necessary.
FLA. STAT. § 106.07(I)(4)(a) (1989).
68. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 398.
69. FLA. CODE JUD. CoNDucT Canon 7(B)(2) (1988).
70. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
1991]
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campaign contributions, and Florida Statutes section 106.07, which re-
quires that contributions be made public for all, including the candi-
date, to inspect.71
Even without the public disclosure of campaign contributions man-
dated by statute, elected judges can not help but know who their sup-
porters are because those supporters attend campaign functions such as
fundraisers. 72 Consequently, despite the existence of Cannon 7(B)(2),
judges are not insulated from knowledge of who backs their campaigns
and, therefore, the Breakstone court's reliance on Cannon 7(B)(2) was
misplaced. The majority stated that not all suspicions of judicial bias
are legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.73 "There are countless
factors which may cause some members of the community to think that
a judge would be biased in favor of a litigant or counsel for a litigant,
e.g., friendship, member of the same church or religious congregation,
neighbors, former classmates or fraternity brothers," the court
explained.7 4
However, courts have held that circumstances which give the ap-
pearance of bias may rise to the level of legally sufficient grounds for
disqualification. In Potashnick v. Port City Construction Co.,7 5 for ex-
ample, the court held that where the father of a judge is a partner in a
law firm which represents a litigant before the judge, disqualification is
required.76
In the context of judicial election campaigns, it was held in Caleffe
v. Vitale77 that disqualification was warranted where the counsel for
one of the litigants in a divorce action was running the judge's ongoing
campaign for re-election. 8
71. Note, Safeguarding the Litigant's Constitutional Right to a Fair and Impar-
tial Forum: A Due Process Approach to Improprieties Arising from Judicial Cam-
paign Contributions from Lawyers, 86 MICH. L. REv. 382, 385 (1987).
72. Id.
73. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399.
74. Id.
75. 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).
76. Id. at 1113.
77. 488 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The majority opinion in
Breakstone does mention Caleffe in a footnote. "Although a motion for disqualification
based solely upon a legal campaign contribution is not legally sufficient, it may well be
that such a contribution, in conjunction with some additional factor, would constitute
legally sufficient grounds for disqualificaiton upon motion." 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 400
n.5 (emphasis in original).
78. Caleffe, 488 So. 2d at 629. But see Raybon v. Burnette, 135 So. 2d 228, 230
(Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 1961) (Plaintiff and plaintiffs attorneys campaigned for unsuc-
[Vol. 15
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The Breakstone majority found support in other jurisdictions for
its position that a lawful campaign contribution by an attorney to a
judge is not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification.79 In Ains-
worth v. Combined Insurance Co. of America,"0 the Nevada Supreme
Court held that involvement of plaintiff's lawyer in the re-election cam-
paign of the court's former chief justice some years earlier did not con-
stitute legally sufficient grounds for disqualification. 1 The Breakstone
court quoted Ainsworth for the proposition that:
[L]eading members of the state bar play important and active roles
in guiding the public's selection of qualified jurists. Under these
circumstances, it would be highly anomalous if an-attorney's prior
participation in a justice's campaign could create a disqualifying
interest, an appearance of impropriety or a violation of due process
sufficient to require the justice's recusal from all cases in which
that attorney might be involved.82
The Breakstone court also found support for its position in Frade
v. Costa,83 and quoted the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as
saying a lawful, ordinary campaign contribution "'does not tend to in-
dicate any closer relation between the contributor and the recipient
than would ordinarily exist between members of the same local
bar.' -84
However, the Breakstone majority did not consider several Texas
cases on point, perhaps due to that jurisdiction's well known willingness
to see no evil when it comes to judical campaign contributions.8 5 In
Rocha v. Ahmad,88 the Texas court held that disqualification was not
cessful judicial candidate who was one of plaintiff's lawyers, and defense attorneys en-
dorsed and contributed finahcially to campaign of the judge. Held, insufficient grounds
for disqualification.).
79. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399.
80. 774 P.2d 1003 (Nev. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 376 (1989).
81. Id. at 1020.
82. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399 (quoting Ainsworth, 774 P.2d at
1020).
83. 171 N.E.2d 863 (Mass. 1961).
84. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 399 (quoting Frade, 171 N.E.2d at 865).
85. Texas precedent on the issue dates back to Coker v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 100
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (plaintiff's attorney active in judge's reelection campaign was
insufficient grounds for disqualification, especially in light of participation in same
campaign by one of defendant's attorneys).
86. 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
1991] 333
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warranted where counsel for a litigant had contributed "many
thousands of dollars" to two justices' election campaigns and held vic-
tory celebrations for those justices in his law offices. 87 The court dis-
missed the matter, saying:
It is not surprising that attorneys are the principal source of contri-
butions in a judicial election. We judicially know that voter apathy
is a continuing problem, especially in judicial races and particul~ry
in contests for a seat on an appellate bench. A candidate for the
bench who relies solely on contributions from nonlawyers must rec-
oncile himself to staging a campaign on something less than a
shoestring. If a judge cannot sit on a case in which a countributing
lawyer is involved as counsel, judges who have been elected would
have to recuse themselves in perhaps a majority of the cases filed in
their courts. Perhaps the next step would be to require a judge to
recuse himself in any case in which one of the lawyers had refused
to contribute or, worse still, had contributed to that judge's
opponent.88
Similarly, in River Road Neighborhood Association v. South
Texas Sports, Inc.,89 the same court ruled, in a case involving the same
contributing counsel and the same recipient justices, that disqualifica-
tion was not required even though the attorney had contributed 21.7 %
of one justice's total reported contributions, and 17.1 % of the other
justice's total campaign war chest. 90
The most widely known example of the Texan approach to this
issue came in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co.,91 in which the appellate
court dismissed Texaco's contention that a $10,000 contribution from
Pennzoil's lead attorney to the election campaign of the presiding judge
two days after the suit was filed did not warrant disqualification. 2
B. What the Majority Did Not Say
The court's opinion in Breakstone9 3 is based on the right of free
87. Id. at 77-78.
88. Id. at 78.
89. 673 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
90. Id. at 952-953. In River Road the contributing attorney was a party, not
counsel.
91. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
92. Id. at 842-843.
93. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
334 [Vol. 15
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association guaranteed by the first amendment, but the court did not
directly deal with the competing constitutional principle of due process
which requires judicial impartiality. 4 The due process approach to the
issue is at the heart of the Third District Court of Appeal's majority
opinion in Breakstone,95 and is the argument advanced by Justice
Overton in his separate opinion.9 6
State law regarding the disqualification of judges is rooted in the
principle of due process.97 The U.S. Supreme Court stated in Tumey v.
Ohio,"' that:
Every procedure which.would offer a possible temptation to the av-
erage man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the state and the accused,
denies the latter due process of law.99
In In re Murchison,100 the Court added that "a fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course re-
quires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfair-
ness." 10 1 The Court went on to say that, "to perform its high function
in the best way 'justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.' "102
The theme that due process requires not only impartiality, but the
appearance of impartiality, is present in Canon 3(C)(1) of Florida's
Code of Judicial Conduct,10 3 in state statutes on the disqualification of
judges in civil cases,104 and case law interpreting disqualification stat-
94. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. ("nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..
95. 561 So. 2d at 1166-73.
96. 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401.
97. See Note, supra note 71, at 391.
98. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
99. Id. at 532.
100. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
101. Id. at 136.
102. Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
103. FLA. CODE JUD. COND'UCT, Canon 3(c)(1) (1988).
104. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.432.
(a) Grounds. Any party may move to disqualify the judge assigned to the
action on the grounds provided by statute.
(b) Contents. A motion to disqualify shall allege the facts relied on to
show the grounds for disqualification and shall be verified by the party.
(c) Time. A motion to disqualify shall be made within a reasonable time
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utes. °5 As explained by Overton in his opinion in Breakstone: "The
Code of Judicial Conduct, in Canon 3(C)(1), states that, '[a] judge
should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality
might be reasonably questioned.' " Overton went on to cite case law
in which the court has construed Canon 3(C)(1) as being consistent
with precedent holding that in a motion for disqualification, a judge
need only consider whether the fear of bias exists in the mind of the
moving party and whether that fear is well grounded.10" Overton also
quoted Dickenson v. Parks,x08 for the proposition that public confidence
in the integrity of its judiciary is crucial:
after discovery of the facts constituting grounds for disqualification.
(d) Determination. The judge against whom the motion is directed shall
determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion. The judge shall not pass
on the truth of the facts alleged. If the motion is legally sufficient, the
judge shall enter an order of disqualification and proceed no further in the
action.
(e) Judge's Initiative. Nothing in this rule limits a judge's authority to
enter an order of disqualification on the judge's own initiative.
Id.
Florida Statutes section 38.10 provides in part:
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding makes and files an affidavit
stating that he fears he will not receive a fair trial in the court where the
suit is pending on account of the prejudice of the judge of that court
against the applicant or in favor of the adverse party, the judge shall pro-
ceed no further, but another judge shall be designated in the manner pre-
scribed by the laws of this state for the substitution of judges for the trial
of causes in which the presiding judge is disqualified. Every such affidavit
shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that any such bias or
prejudice exists and shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of
record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith.
FLA. STAT. § 38.10 (1989).
105. See, e.g., Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983); Dickenson
v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 582-584, 140 So. 459, 462 (1932).
106. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401 (emphasis in original). For a critical
look at Canon 3C(1), see Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28
REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 694 (1973). Then-Justice Rehnquist stated that, "though the Ca-
nons of Ethics are extrordinarily detailed and specific about what constitutes a 'finan-
cial interest,' they have virtually nothing to say about what constitutes 'bias.'" Rehn-
quist suggested that the use of the word "favoritism" would be clearer than "bias." Id.
at 708-711.
107. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401 (citing State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell,
131 Fla. 566, 573, 179 So. 695, 697-698 (1938)); Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083,
1086 (Fla. 1983); Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
108. 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932).
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Prejudice of a judge is a delicate question to raise but when raised
as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predicated on grounds with a
modicum of reason, the judge against whom raised, should be
prompt to recuse himself. No judge under any circumstances is
warranted in sitting in the trial of a cause whose neutrality is
shadowed or even questioned.109
In weighing the effects on impartiality and the appearance of im-
partiality created by lawyer contributions to judicial election cam-
paigns, courts should consider the amount of the contribution, the tim-
ing of the contribution, and whether there is a pattern of support
between the contributor and recipient. Consideration of these factors is
useful in determining whether the recipient has an interest in the out-
come of a particular case involving the contributor, and therefore is
useful in determining the potential due process infringement.110 In
Florida, the maximum dollar amount of a contribution to a trial court
judicial campaign is limited to no more than $1,000.111 However, the
amount of a contribution may have particular significance to the recipi-
ent because of its size in comparison to other contributions received. As
Overton noted in Breakstone, the $500 contribution in question was the
second largest received by the candidate.11 2 Considering the timing fac-
tor, Overton noted that the judicial election campaign of Judge Mac-
Kenzie's husband was ongoing at the time the disqualification motion
was made.113 Although Florida limits contributions to trial court judi-
cial campaigns to $1,000,114 and requires public disclosure of contribu-
tions, 1 5 the potential exists for an infringement on due process. De-
pending on the proportionate size of the campaign contribution, the
timing of the contribution and the existence of a pattern of support, the
lawful contribution could affect the judge's impartiality as well as the
public perception of impartiality. The court's holding in Breakstone116
that an attorney's lawful campaign contribution to a judicial candidate
is not legally sufficient grounds for disqualification ignores the potential
109. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401 (quoting Dickenson, 104 Fla. at 582-
584, 104 So. at 462).
110. See Note, supra note 71 at 403.
111. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1987).
112. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 401.
113. Id.
114. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(1)(e) (1987).
115. FLA. STAT. § 106.07(4)(a) (1987).
116. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
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for due process infringement.
Part III
Justice Kogan, in his concurring opinion in Breaksione, calls the
majority's position on judicial disqualification "the lesser of evils from
which we must choose."' "17 Kogan goes on to describe what evil lurks on
the side of the issue chosen by Overton."18 According to Kogan's view,
the dangers include the possibility that contributions to judicial cam-
paigns would be made by lawyers or litigants soley for the purpose of
avoiding particular judges who Would be required to grant a motion for
disqualification. 1" 9 This, Kogan notes, would have the double negative
impact of securing contributions for those inferior candidates that con-
tributing lawyers and litigants would seek to avoid through disqualifica-
tion, and would promote "judge-shopping."' 120 The combined effect
would be "an administrative nightmare" in the judicial system.'l2 Fi-
nally, Kogan suggests that well-motivated lawyer contributions to the
best qualified judicial -candidates would dry up, and as a result, only
the wealthy or those supported by special interests could afford the cost
of a judicial election campaign. 22 An answer to the dilemma presented
by Breakstone rests in the hands of Florida voters and their legislators,
Kogan said, suggesting a merit retention system for trial court judges
along with public financing of judicial election campaigns.123 "So long
as judicial seats can be filled by elections financed by private campaign
contributions, we in Florida must live with a system that opens the door
to some type of ab use," Justice Kogan wrote.1 24
Florida is not alone in its struggle to solve the problems inherent in
electing judges.'25 As one author noted, "[iit may well be that no sub-
ject in American law has provoked more articles, more speeches and
meetings, more hearings and struggles in legislatures and for constitu-
117. Id. at 400 (Kogan, J., concurring). -
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 400-01.




125. See, e.g., Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Cam-
paign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REv. 449, 452-66 (1988).
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tional revision, than judicial selection." '26
The practice of electing judges by popular vote was not instituted
by the founding fathers of our nation, 127 but rather emerged after 1832
as part of the Jacksonian era's wave of democratization of the Ameri-
can political scene.
128
Today, forty-two states elect some portion of their judiciary. 29
Twenty states, including Florida hold nonpartisan judicial elections. 30
Florida, thirty-three other states, and the District of Columbia use the
"Missouri Plan" process of merit selection and retention for at least
some of their judiciary.' 3' Florida employs merit selection and retention
for its supreme court justices and district court judges. 32 While
twenty-four states now use some form of merit selection and retention
for trial court judges,133 Florida continues to elect its circuit and county
court judges in competitive elections.
A. The Nature of the Judicial Election Problem
Voter apathy and unawareness in the area of judicial elections
have been well documented in a number of studies. 35 As a result of
public apathy, judicial elections are decided not on the issues or the
candidates' records, but on name recognition. 36 The 1982 primary race
of incumbent Alabama Supreme Court Justice Oscar Adams provides
an example of how the name game operates in judicial politics.' 37 Al-
though Adams' challenger was a three-year practitioner from an unac-
credited law school, the challenger had the same name as a popular
bakery and Adams only won the primary by a narrow margin. 138 "Our
survey showed a substantial number voted for him because they
126. Schotland, supra note 10 at 72.
127. Overton, supra note 1, at 11.
128. Atkins, Judicial Elections: What the Evidence Shows, 50 FLA. BJ. 152
(Mar. 1976).
129. Note, supra note 125 at 452.
130. Id.
131. Overton, supra note 1 at 12, 14.
132. Id. at 12-13.
133. Id. at 14.
134. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(b).
135. Schotland, supra note 10, at 86-88.
136. Overton, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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thought he was the bakery man," Justice Adams said."'9
Buying name recognition in a contested election is an expensive
proposition. The price tag for an average campaign for a Dade County
circuit court judgeship is $150,000, but, in one race a judicial candi-
date spent $600,000, while his opponent spent $350,000.140 In jurisdic-
tions in which competitive judicial elections are held, the national trend
is toward more contested elections at a steadily escalating cost.141
These increasingly expensive judicial elections will require more
campaign contributions to pay the bills and a high percentage of the
contributions to judicial campaigns come from lawyers. 4 2 A 1982
study showed that in Florida, 50 % of the contributors to judicial cam-
paigns were lawyers and that lawyers gave 50 % of the money raised by
judicial candidates from outside sources. 14 3
Lawyer contributions to judicial campaigns raise concerns about
the integrity and independence of the judiciary. 4 4 Concerning the ethi-
cal dilemma, one judge said, "I very much appreciated the contribu-
tions I received from others. However, it makes me feel uncomfortable
dealing with them in court.' '1 45
B. The Merit Selection and Retention Solution
Extending merit selection and retention to trial court judges is the
most frequently mentioned solution to the problems posed by Break-
stone.46 The move has been endorsed by The Florida Bar, the League
of Women Voters, and the Circuit Judges Conference. 1 7 The 1978 re-
port of the Constitutional Revision Commission recommended the
139. Id.
140. Report of the Florida Bar Commission on Merit Selection and Retention
of Trial Judges, 11 app. (Jan. 1990). (Comments of Miami politicial consultant Gerald
Schwartz before the Commission in a public hearing in Miami) [hereinafter Report].
141. Schotland, supra note 10, at 77.
142. Id. at 136.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 120. (Schotland writes, "I reject the proposition that practices ...
inherent in judicial elections can be called corrupt. Present campaign financing prac-
tices put undue strain on actual judicial integrity and independence, on the judiciary's
and the bar's appearance of intregrity and independence .... ")
145. Note, The Ethical Dilemma of Campaigning for Judicial Office: A Pro-
posed Solution, 14 FORDHAM UaB. L.J. 353, 402 (1986).
146. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
147. Overton, supra note 1, at 21-22.
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change, as did the 1984 report of the Article V Review Commision. 14
The Florida Bar Commission on Merit Selection and Retention
recommended extending the process to trial court judges as a means of
upgrading the quality of judges and eliminating the public perception
of impropriety spawned by judicial election campaigns. 149
The predominant contributors to judicial elections are attorneys.
The collection of large sums of money from those who will be rep-
resenting clients before the judges creates the appearance [of] im-
propriety in the eyes of the general public. Although the commis-
sion did not find that this, in fact, does create'widespread problems
of favoritism; the perception of favoritism by the public is a very
real and serious problem which poisons the public's attitude toward
our justice system generally. 50
However, even supporters of the move to extend merit selection
and retention to Florida's trial judges admit that problems would re-
main,151 because those judges would still face election to retain their
positions. But the major problem with the view that merit retention will
ease the present dilemma is that extending merit retention to trial court
judges requires a constitutional amendment, which requires legislative
action. The most recent attempt to pass legislation placing such a con-
stitutional amendment on the ballot was House Joint Resolution 9,
which was referred to the House Judiciary Committee, 52 where it died
in June 1990. Therefore, for the present and forseeable future, the
courts should not look to the legislature for solutions to the problems
Breakstone'53 represents.
Part IV
Justice Kogan's lesser evil approach to this issue is only necessi-
tated by the court's all-or-nothing answer to the Breakstone dilemma.
A more sensible alternative is a case-by-case approach which balances
148. Id.
149. Report, supra note 140, at 18-19.
150. Id.
151. Breakstone, 15 Fla. L. Weekly at 400. Justice Barkett, in a brief concurring
opinion, stated that, "merit retention elections requiring judges to solicit campaign
funds are subject to the same concerns as those presented here. Therefore, although
merit retention improves the situation, it is not the answer to the problem." Id.
152. Journal of the House of Representatives, No. I, at 9 (April 3, 1990).
153. 15 Fla. L. Weekly 397.
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the freedom of association of campaign contributors against the due
process requirement of judicial impartiality.
Such a case-by-case analysis would require consideration of at
least three relevant factors relating to the judicial campaign contribu-
tion. Those factors are the proportionate size of the contribution in re-
lationship to other contributions received, the timing of the contribu-
tion, and whether any pattern of support exists between the contributor
and the judge.
While the Court chose not to consider such circumstances in
Breakstone, the facts of Keane v. Andrews154 offered the court another
opportunity to look beyond the mere fact that the contribution was
within the legal limit. In Keane, Dr. Moulton Keane moved for the
disqualification of Broward County Circuit Court Judge Robert L. An-
drews on grounds that opposing counsel had contributed to the judge's
campaign.1 55 But while opposing counsel contributed $500 to the
judge's campaign, contributions by his firm and members of the firm
brought the total contribution to $3,850.156 These contributions, made
during a two-month period of 1988, represented 17.25 % of the judge's
campaign contributions through the first eight months of that year.157
Only by assessing the circumstances surrounding the lawful contri-
bution is it possible to determine the importance of the contribution to
the recipient judge. The greater the importance, the greater the poten-
tial for due process infringement. By not considering the relevant cir-
cumstances surrounding judicial campaign contributions the Court is
opening the door to due process violations created by the appearance of
judicial bias.
Peter Cooke
154. 555 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, (1990 Fla.
LEXIS 1090).
155. Id.
156. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 2, Keane v. Andrews, 555 So. 2d 940
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (No. 75,378), review denied, (1990 Fla. LEXIS 1090).
157. Id. at 2-3.
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